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ABSTRACT
Peer consistency evaluation is often used in games with a purpose (GWAP) to
evaluate workers using outputs of other workers without using gold standard
answers. Despite its popularity, the reliability of peer consistency evalua-
tion has never been systematically tested to show how it can be used as a
general evaluation method in human computation systems. We present ex-
perimental results that show that human computation systems using peer
consistency evaluation can lead to outcomes that are even better than those
that evaluate workers using gold standard answers. We also show that even
without evaluation, simply telling the workers that their answers will be used
as future evaluation standards can significantly enhance the workers’ perfor-
mance. Results have important implication for methods that improve the
reliability of human computation systems.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Human computation [1] is a technique that utilizes human activities to re-
place traditional digital computers to perform certain computational tasks.
The benefit of human computation is that some problems that are often dif-
ficult for machines can be accomplished relatively easily for humans (e.g.,
vision, natural language processing). The ESP game [2], for example, en-
courages players to generate image labels while enjoying the game. Human
computation is also used for security [3], speech-to-text translation [4], and
generation of labeled data for natural language processing [5]. These exam-
ples have merely begun to demonstrate the potential of human computation
as a social computing technique that can be applied in a wide range of situ-
ations.
One of the biggest challenges for developing effective human computation
systems is the reliability of the outcomes [6]. Unlike traditional computa-
tional systems, workers in a human computation system may fail to reliably
generate correct outputs for many reasons. One notable reason is that work-
ers may not have the incentives to put forth enough effort to finish the task
assigned to them [7]. Another reason is that the instructions given to the
workers may not be clear enough for them to follow [8]. These factors have
made it difficult to build a reliable human computation system. The poten-
tial unreliability may in general decrease the utility of human computation
systems. Systematic testing of methods that can potentially enhance the re-
liability of human computation systems is therefore critical for their success.
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Figure 1.1: A graphical representation of peer consistency evaluation.
Every worker in the system is evaluated by the answers provided by the
previous workers, which means it is a very scalable mechanism.
1.1 Peer consistency evaluation in output agreement
games
Games with a purpose(GWAP) [9] harness the power of human computation
by making their players work while enjoying the games. An output agreement
game is one of the earliest and most popular forms of GWAP. A typical
output agreement game has the following procedure: the game first randomly
matches multiple players and provides them the same set of inputs, which can
be images [2], words [10], or any data that the game designer wants to label.
Then, the players start to generate outputs that are related to the inputs.
The players will be rewarded if the outputs generated by different players
reach a certain level of agreement. When the game ends, some versions of
the agreed outputs will be collected as the labels that describe the data.
Output agreement games use the consistency between the players to en-
sure the quality of the collected data. Although previous research questioned
whether peer consistency evaluation used in an output agreement game can
persuade workers to generate high-quality outputs [11], recent research [12]
has shown that the gaming environment not only could encourage the play-
ers to generate answers that matched other players’ responses, but could also
encourage players to generate high-quality answers.
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These results allow us to hypothesize that human computation systems
with peer consistency evaluation could outperform those without any evalu-
ation because peer consistency evaluation provide evaluation standards that
can approximate correct answers. This is our first hypothesis.
H1: Peer consistency evaluation can serve as a valid evaluation method to
motivate workers to generate outcomes with high-quality. Therefore, workers
with peer consistency evaluation have better performance than those without
evaluation.
1.2 Peer consistency as a better evaluation mechanism
Existing human computation systems often use gold standard answers to
evaluate their workers [13, 14, 15, 7]. A gold standard answer is an objec-
tively determined correct answer. For example, gold standard answers for
a part-of-speech (POS) tagging task can be the correct POS of each word
in the sentences or articles of the tasks determined by human experts (e.g.,
linguists). Therefore, gold standard evaluation is considered one of the most
objective mechanisms that can accurately measure the performance of work-
ers.
However, gold standard answers of a task can be very costly [15]. Thus,
people often compromise by mixing a few tasks that have the gold standard
answers with the majority of tasks without them, and evaluation is often
only based on those that have the gold standard answers. This may decrease
the effectiveness of the evaluation because repeated workers can find out and
only work hard on the evaluation questions [15]. On the other hand, peer
consistency evaluation directly utilizes outputs of previous workers to evalu-
ate outcomes of future workers, such that the system can generate abundant
questions to evaluate workers. Therefore, an important focus of the current
article is to investigate the extent to which peer consistency evaluation can be
as effective as gold standard evaluation to encourage high quality outcomes
from workers, because peer consistency evaluation is much more scalable and
cost-effective.
Compared with gold standard evaluation, a potential advantage of peer
consistency evaluation is that it may also increase the perception that workers
are connected to other workers in the system, as workers are informed that
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their answers will be evaluated by the answers of others and their answers
will also be used to evaluate future workers’ answers. The implicit social
interactions among workers could serve as a form of social motivation for
workers to work harder. For example, workers may be motivated to match the
performance of others - a competitive motive; or to provide good answers to
evaluate future workers - an altruistic motive [12]. Peer evaluation also makes
the rewards of the workers dependent on each others’ answers. This is because
if one worker does not generate the correct answer, the other workers would
be incorrectly penalized due to this erroneous evaluation standard. This can
be another incentive for them to put more effort into the tasks because it is
possible that workers may have the altruistic tendency to adjust their effort
level to avoid unfair evaluation to future workers [16]. As a result, workers
may realize that their performance not only affect their personal reward, but
also the reward of their “colleagues”.
Therefore, the altruism of workers can provide another motive for them to
generate high-quality outcomes, which is our second hypothesis:
H2: Peer consistency evaluation can further motivate workers utilizing the
altruism of them. As a result, the workers with peer consistency evaluation
can perform better than those with gold standard evaluation.
On the other hand, this may also increase the perception of unfairness in
the evaluation because it sometimes incorrectly penalizes the workers – i.e., if
previous workers provided bad answers, the new workers might be penalized
even if they generate good answers. The perception of unfair evaluation may
decrease the incentives for the workers to provide good answers. This leads
us to the third hypothesis:
H3: The unfairness of peer consistency evaluation can discourage work-
ers to put effort in generating good work, which harms the reliability of the
system.
1.3 The experiments
In the current study, we aim at examining the three hypotheses mentioned
above by experiments that teased out different effects.
Our first experiment tested whether systems with peer consistency evalu-
ation can generate reliable outcomes compared with systems with gold stan-
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dard evaluation and with no evaluation (H1). Because it is possible that
financial incentives may interact with the evaluation method, we also cre-
ated three bonus levels in each evaluation condition to investigate their ef-
fects. Moreover, our second experiment separated the effects of evaluation
and altruism of peer consistency evaluation to see if altruism itself was effec-
tive in enhancing worker performance (H2). Finally, we analyzed how the
unfairness (incorrect penalty) affected the performance of workers in peer
consistency evaluation (H3).
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
Human computation and crowdsourcing are two highly overlapped fields.
However, the focus of the fields are slightly different – human computa-
tion tends to focus more on replacing digital computers with humans while
crowdsouring focus more on replacing traditional human workers with online
workers [7]. Therefore, the research in crowdsourcing often focuses more on
managing the workflow to solve complex work [17, 18, 19]. On the other hand,
research in human computation focuses more on generating reliable answers
to questions that are difficult for digital computers to solve [7]. Given our
goal is to understand tasks that are often difficult to handle by digital com-
puters (e.g., natural language processing), we choose to use the term human
computation throughout. We, however, believe that research in crowdsourc-
ing is highly relevant to our research.
Many approaches have been proposed to enhance the reliability of human
computation. Some researchers used statistical methods to eliminate errors
and biases of the outcomes generated by the workers [20, 21, 6, 22, 5]. Other
researchers proposed different task designs to induce workers to produce high-
quality outputs. Huang et al. [23] proposed a prediction model that helped
the requester achieve an optimized task design by varying the variables in
the design (e.g. price, number of tasks). Dow et al. [24] showed that in-
stant self-assessment and external-assessment could enhance the quality of
the work. Sun et al. [25] found that it is easier for workers to pick the better
answer than generate the good answer. Therefore, they designed a tourna-
ment selection method that asks the workers to pick the better answers at
each round. Mason and Watts [26] studied the relation between the financial
incentives and the performance of the workers. They found that the amount
of financial incentives did not affect the performance of the workers, but some
compensation schemes did yield better outcomes. Lin et al. [27] designed
AGENTHUNT, a system that can dynamically switch between alternative
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workflows to achieve better worker performance. Little et al. created Turkit
[28], a framework that allowed the workers to iteratively improve the pre-
vious workers’ work. Liem et al. [4] further incorporated a dual pathway
structure to the system. The dual pathway structure evaluated the workers
in one path using the works of the workers in the other path, and rewarded
the workers based on the similarity between their works. They showed that
the system with their proposed structure could achieve 96.6% accuracy on
a speech-to-text transcription task. Although they did show that a system
with peer consistency evaluation could have good performance, they focused
on a particular application and did not analyze how and why peer consis-
tency evaluation could enhance the reliability of the systems. Therefore, the
main contribution of their study and ours differ.
2.1 Gold standard evaluation
Gold standard evaluation is another mechanism that often adopted by hu-
man computation researchers [13, 14, 15] and industry (e.g., CrowdFlower1)
to ensure the quality of human computation outcomes. Le et al. [14] studied
how to spread the gold standard evaluation questions to enhance the relia-
bility of collected outcomes. Harris [13] also showed that providing positive
incentives for workers to match gold standard answers yield better works.
Oleson et al. [15] noticed that gold standard data is difficult and costly to
get, but the size of gold standard data is important to quality assurance.
They solved this problem by using previous matched answers with high con-
fidence as ”programmatic gold” to expand the size of gold standard data.
Though both programmatic gold and peer consistency evaluation use an-
swers of previous workers to evaluate newer workers, the former mechanism
aims to create more gold standard answers in a cost-effective way, while the
latter directly tell the workers that their answers will be evaluated by an
answer of a previous worker. Therefore, programmatic gold cannot benefit
from the possible social interactions between the workers of peer consistency
evaluation.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first one that makes a
systematic comparison between peer consistency evaluation and traditional
1https://crowdflower.com/
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gold standard evaluation and proves that peer consistency evaluation is a
valid mechanism to enhance the reliability of human computation.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The goal of our experiment is to see whether peer consistency evaluation
can improve the reliability of human computation systems. We recruited 270
subjects from Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)1, a platform that recruits
online workers to solve human intelligence tasks (HITs) [29]. We asked the
workers to perform tasks on systems with no evaluation (N), gold standard
evaluation (GS), and peer consistency evaluation (PC). We also varied the
level of bonus the workers could receive when passing the evaluation to study
if there were interactions between the financial incentives and evaluation
methods.
3.1 Noun counting task
The workers in our experiment were asked to count the words with a partic-
ular part-of-speech (noun) in a list of 30 words. Each word in the word list
had equal probabilities to be a noun or not a noun. We created 1,000 tasks,
and the answers to the tasks ranged from 7 to 23. Since we recruited 270
workers in our experiment and each worker completed five tasks, 1,350 tasks
were randomly picked from the task pool. There were two advantages of this
task that made it a very good test-bed for us to examine the ability of the
evaluation mechanisms to enhance reliability. First, it had a ground truth
(objectively correct answer) to serve as the gold standard, so the quality of
an answer could be measured by the difference between the answer and the
gold standard. Moreover, the workers needed to put in a certain level of
effort to solve the task2. This task is also representative of the tasks used in
previous human computation systems (e.g., [5, 2]). An example interface of
1https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome
2The difference between an average answer and the gold standard was 3.78, which
supports our argument.
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the task is shown in Figure 3.1.
3.2 Evaluation mechanisms in the systems
In our experiment, we compared the systems with three evaluation mecha-
nisms:
• No evaluation (N): The system with no evaluation was used to im-
itate a basic human computation system. The workers who worked in
the system received a bonus regardless of the quality of the answers
that they generated.
• Gold standard evaluation (GS): In the system with gold standard
evaluation, the answers generated by the workers were evaluated by
the correct answers. The workers earned a bonus if their answer was
accurate enough. We allowed the workers to make some minor mistakes
by accepting the answers with difference to the gold standards less than
or equal to three3.
• Peer consistency evaluation (PC): Peer consistency evaluation was
similar to gold standard evaluation, but the standards used to evaluate
the workers were different. When a worker was working with a system
utilizing peer consistency evaluation, the system first randomly picked a
previous worker and used the answer generated by that previous worker
as the standard of evaluation. Then, the worker who was performing
the task could earn a bonus if the difference between the answer of the
current worker and the evaluation standard was less than or equal to
three (the same difference as in gold standard evaluation).
3.3 Bonus levels
The workers who worked in the experiment could earn a low bonus ($0.01), a
medium bonus ($0.05), or a high bonus ($0.10) if they passed the evaluation
3We tried only accepting the answers that were exactly correct, but this greatly hurt
the performance of the workers as providing the exact number of nouns in a long word list
can sometimes be very difficult.
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Figure 3.1: An example interface of the noun counting task
of the task. We chose these three bonus levels based on an empirical study
[29] that shows that more than 90% of the HITs on AMT have a price tag
less than $0.10, and 70% of them have a price tag less than $0.05. These are
also the three financial incentive levels used in [26]. Of course, the reasonable
price of a task should be determined by many factors (e.g., difficulty of task,
interestingness of work). However, the purpose of this manipulation is to
understand the extent to which the effects of different evaluation methods
might interact with those induced by different levels of financial incentives.
3.4 Subject recruitment on Amazon Mechanical Turk
We published our HITs on AMT from 5/13/2012 to 5/22/2012. The title and
the description of these HITs were both ”Count the nouns in a word list”. We
did not require our workers to pass any qualification tests, but we did require
them to have more than 100 approved HITs and a HIT approval rate higher
than 95%. This is a quality assurance mechanism usually used by requesters
in AMT, and it prevented the results of our experiment from being affected
by too many spammers. The price tags for the HITs were $0.05, which were
the rewards the workers could earn regardless of their performance. On the
HIT page, we provided a link to route the workers to our experiment website
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and a text area for the workers to enter a unique eight-digit completion code.
When the workers completed their jobs, our website showed them the total
bonus they could earn for their performance and the completion code that
they could enter in the original HIT page on AMT. We then paid the workers
both of their rewards (performance independent) and bonuses (performance
codependent) based on the completion codes they entered.
3.5 Experimental interface
After the workers visited the experiment website, they were randomly as-
signed to one of the 9 conditions4. On the introduction page, the system
told the workers that they had to answer 5 questions about counting the
nouns in a word list. It also showed how much bonus they could earn for
each question. After starting the task, the workers could see the interface
for performing the noun counting task (Figure 3.1). In the upper part of
the interface, the system showed a word list and an input box for them to
provide their answers. The system specifically told the workers to count a
word as a noun if one of its definition is a noun because it is possible for a
word to have multiple definitions and only some of them are nouns. This
made the gold standard answer of the question clearer to the workers. The
system also told the workers how it would evaluate them in the lower part
of the interface. The exact words used in this part by different systems are
summarized below:
• No evaluation (N): You can earn bonus5 for providing the answer.
• Gold standard evaluation (GS): We will evaluate your answer by
the correct answer. If your answer is similar enough (-3 to +3) to the
correct answer, you can earn bonus for this question. Otherwise, your
answer will be rejected and you can’t receive the reward.
• Peer Consistency Evaluation (PC): We will evaluate your answer
by an answer of a previous worker. If your answers are similar enough
(-3 to +3), you can earn the bonus for this question. Otherwise, your
answer will be rejected and you can’t receive the reward.
43 evaluation mechanisms X 3 bonus levels.
5It showed the amount of bonus: $0.01, $0.05, or $0.10
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When the workers finished each question, the system informed the workers
whether they passed the evaluation or not. If they passed the evaluation,
the system added the bonus of the question to the total bonus earned by
the workers and show it in the middle part of the interface. After finishing
5 questions, the workers would be redirected to a completion page which
showed them the amount of bonus they could earn and the completion code.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
270 subjects (30 subjects per treatment) were recruited from AMT, each of
them completed 5 noun counting task and generated 5 labels, so 1,350 labels
(150 labels per treatment) were collected for our result analysis.
To evaluate the results of our experiment, we first computed the label
accuracy of each collected label. The label accuracy shows how close the label
is to the gold standard answer. Therefore, the formula for label accuracy is:
Label Accuracy = 1− |NGS −Nworker|
Max(30−NGS, NGS)
Where NGS is the correct number of nouns in the list, Nworker is the number
of nouns in the list reported by the worker. Therefore, the numerator of the
second term in the formula is the distance between the label generated by
the worker and the gold standard answer, and the denominator of it is the
distance between the worst possible answer and the gold standard answer.
(If NGS > 15, the worst possible answer is 0. Otherwise, it is 30.) Therefore,
the label accuracy is a number between 1 and 0, where 1 represents that the
label is exactly the same as the gold standard, and 0 means that the answer
is the worst possible answer. Then the average label accuracy of each worker
was computed by averaging the label accuracy of the five labels generated by
the worker. We used the average label accuracy of the workers to measure
their quality of works.
We conducted a 3X3 ANOVA to see if there were significant effects of
the evaluation mechanisms, bonus levels, and their interactions. The results
showed that the evaluation mechanisms did significantly affect the average la-
bel accuracy of the workers (F (2, 261) = 11.08, p < 0.001). Moreover, the ef-
fect of bonus levels was marginally significant (F (2, 261) = 2.72, p = 0.067).
However, the effect of the interactions of the two factors were not significant
(F (4, 261) = 1.15, p = 0.34). Because the analysis shows that the effects
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Figure 4.1: The mean of the average label accuracies of the workers under
different evaluation mechanisms and bonus levels (with standard error). In
general, the workers under peer consistency evaluation outperformed the
ones under gold standard evaluation and without evaluation.
of bonus levels is only marginal to significant and the interaction between
evaluation method and bonus levels was not significant, in the current result
analysis, we focus on the effects of the evaluation mechanisms.
4.1 The effects of the evaluation mechanisms
The mean of the average label accuracies for the workers with different eval-
uation mechanisms and bonus levels are summarized in Figure 4.1 and the
comparisons between different conditions are summarized in Table 4.1. The
results show that the average label accuracy of the workers in the systems
with peer consistency evaluation was significantly higher than the systems
with no evaluation. In addition, there was also a significant difference be-
tween the performance of the workers in the systems with gold standard
evaluation and the systems with no evaluation. Interestingly, the workers in
the systems with peer consistency evaluation also outperformed the workers
in the systems with gold standard evaluation.
When we further analyzed the results of the systems with different bonus
levels, we observed that with low or medium bonuses ($0.01 or $0.05), the
workers under peer consistency evaluation performed significantly better than
the workers under no evaluation and the workers under gold standard eval-
uation. In addition, there was no significant difference between the workers
assessed via no evaluation and gold standard evaluation.
However, when we increased the bonus to the highest level ($0.10), there
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was nearly no difference between the workers under peer consistency evalua-
tion and the ones under gold standard evaluation, and the difference between
the workers under gold standard evaluation and the ones under no evaluation
became significant.
These differences, of course, need to be interpreted cautiously, as the overall
interaction effect between bonus and evaluation method was not significant.
Nevertheless, we can see that the difference between the ability to enhance
reliability between the two evaluation methods is larger when the workers
received low or medium bonuses. While the main effects of evaluation meth-
ods and bonus levels are strong, future studies can further test their possible
interaction effect by introducing more levels of bonus in different evaluation
methods.
4.2 Peer consistency as valid evaluation mechanism
Previous research [12] on peer consistency evaluation in output agreement
games provided a game theoretic analysis for why it could generate higher
quality works in a gaming environment. The analysis showed that because
both players in the game would like to earn points, the player chooses the
answer that is most likely to be the same as the answer generated by the
other player. Thus, the best strategies for both players are putting more
effort to select the correct answer for the task (or the answers that are close
to it). The reason is that since the players cannot communicate with each
other during the game, high-accuracy answers can serve as a protocol for the
two players. By choosing the answers that are close to the gold standard
answer, it increases the probability for them to generate similar answers and
earn points.
Similar analysis also applies to our current study; in our human computa-
tion systems with peer consistency evaluation, workers did not know which
previous worker would be chosen in the evaluation. As a result, there was no
way for them to communicate with each other or agree on some particular an-
swers in advance. Therefore, putting more effort to provide answers with high
accuracy would be generally a desirable strategy for workers, which could be
a factor that enhanced the overall reliability of the system. This analysis
explains why the system with peer consistency evaluation had a higher reli-
17
Figure 4.2: The mean of the average label accuracy of the system with
reciprocal altruism compares to the system with no evaluation and peer
consistency evaluation.
ability compared to the systems without evaluation in our experiment. This
supports H1 that peer consistency evaluation can serve as a valid evaluation
mechanism to motivate workers to generate high-quality work.
4.3 Reciprocal altruism facilitating worker performance
A notable difference between peer consistency evaluation and gold standard
evaluation is that because the system with peer consistency evaluation used
the answers of previous workers as evaluation standards, the performance
of the workers not only affected their own bonus, but also the bonus of
the future workers of the system. If workers did not put enough effort into
selecting a high-quality answer, not only would they lose the chance to earn
the bonus, future workers evaluated by this erroneous answer might also not
get the bonus. Therefore, workers might have an altruistic motive to put
more effort into the task in order to maximize the bonus-earning potential
of their “colleagues”. (H2)
To test if this hypothesis is true, we created another human computation
system with a condition we called reciprocal altruism (RA) and recruited 90
workers1 to conduct the same noun counting task on this system. The workers
130 workers each bonus level
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of the system in the RA condition were not evaluated, but they were told
that their answers would be used as evaluation standards to evaluate future
workers. In other words, the condition was similar to the peer consistency
evaluation condition, except that workers were told that their answers would
not be evaluated. The exact words we put on the interface were as follows:
• Reciprocal altruism (RA): You can earn bonus for providing the
answer. We will use your answer as an evaluation standard for future
workers. They can only earn bonus if their answers are similar to yours.
The mean of the average label accuracy of the system with reciprocal
altruism is shown in Figure 4.2. The results showed that even without any
evaluation, the workers with reciprocal altruism (µ = 78%, SD = 20.8%)
performed significantly better than those without reciprocal altruism (µ =
71%, SD = 24.8%) (t(173) = 2.02, p < 0.05). This provides support to H2
that the altruistic motive did make the workers provide more reliable answers.
The other thing we found was that workers under peer consistency evaluation
still performed significantly better than those in the RA condition (t(160) =
2.80, p < 0.001). One reasonable explanation is that both reciprocal altruism
(that their answers were used to evaluate future workers) and evaluation
feedback (that their answers were evaluated using previous workers answers)
are factors that provide additive effects that made workers perform better.
Peer consistency evaluation allows its system to benefit from the additional
motivating effects of both factors.
4.4 Unfairness as insignificant factor in worker
performance
It is reasonable to assume that the workers under gold standard evaluation
had higher incentives to work harder because peer consistency evaluation
sometimes penalized workers even if they put more effort to generate cor-
rect answers. (H3) Our results, however, clearly showed the opposite effect:
workers in peer consistency evaluation conditions outperformed those in gold
standard evaluation conditions.
To understand this seemingly counter-intuitive result, we analyzed whether
the unfairness of peer consistency evaluation hurt the performance of work-
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Figure 4.3: The comparison between the performance of the good workers
were treated fairly, unfairly, and other workers under peer consistency
evaluation.
ers. We divided the 5 questions answered by each worker into two groups,
and used the first half (first two questions) to identify those that were good
workers in peer evaluation condition. Specifically, workers were considered
good workers if they generated answers that were similar to the gold stan-
dard answers (distance less than 3) in the first 2 questions. These good
workers should have earned the bonuses if the system evaluated their an-
swers using gold standard answers. 62 out of 90 workers in the systems with
peer consistency evaluation were considered good workers by this definition.
These good workers were further divided into two groups: the first group was
treated fairly, in the sense that they actually earned the bonus because the
answers used to evaluate them were also close to the gold standard answers.
In contrast, the second group of them were treated unfairly, in the sense that
they failed to pass peer consistency evaluation for at least one of the first two
questions because they were evaluated by answers that were different from
the gold standard answers. 33 good workers were treated fairly, and the other
29 good workers were treated unfairly by the system with peer consistency
evaluation in the first two questions. By comparing how these two groups of
good workers performed in the next three questions, we could test the extent
to which the fairness of evaluation could impact performance.
The mean of the average label accuracies on the next 3 questions (the
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second half of the 5 questions) of these two groups and other workers that
did not do well in the first 2 questions are shown in Figure 4.3. Although
the good workers who were treated fairly (µ = 93%, SD = 1.2%) performed
slightly better than those who got penalized incorrectly (µ = 90%, SD =
1.5%), the difference of the performance between these two groups was not
significant (t(55) = 1.45, p = 0.15). Moreover, the workers who were treated
unfairly still performed significantly better than the other workers that did
not perform well in the first two questions (µ = 73%, SD = 20.5%) (t(39) =
4.22, p < 0.001). This is in accordance with the previous research that
there is a very low correlation between the performance of the workers and
the quality of evaluation standard [12]. Therefore, at least in our samples
of workers, we did not find that unfairness of evaluation in peer consistency
evaluation could discourage good performance, which contradicts H3.
4.5 Implicit social interaction as possible factor in
enhancing human computation reliability
Research has shown that social interaction can attract workers to voluntarily
conduct tasks for human computation systems [12]. In our experiment, when
the workers could earn high levels of bonus, both peer consistency evaluation
and gold standard evaluation could enhance the reliability of the systems.
However, when the workers only could earn low or medium bonuses, peer
consistency evaluation seemed more effective. It is possible that peer consis-
tency evaluation produced a feeling among the workers that they were not
doing the task alone because they knew that their answers were to be eval-
uated by other workers in the systems, and that their answers also would
be used to evaluate other workers. This implicit social interaction created
a social motivation to encourage them to put extra effort into solving the
task. This could explain why the systems with peer consistency evaluation
outperformed the systems with gold standard evaluation, especially when
workers only receive a minimum level of bonus. In future studies, it will be
useful to conduct a series of carefully controlled experiments that focus on
how the implicit social interactions created by peer consistency evaluation
affect workers’ performance.
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4.6 Possible effects of financial incentive levels
Although the ANOVA results show that the effect of bonus level was only
marginally significant, we found weak evidence of a possible trend in our
results that might provide useful insights for future studies. Specifically, we
found that the means of the average label accuracies of the workers dropped
from 81% to 74% when we increased the bonus from $0.01 to $0.05, and this
number climbed back to 80% when we further raised the bonus to $0.10. This
is in accordance with the findings from previous research [30] that financial
incentives not only bring the utility of monetary reward to the workers, they
also reduce the intrinsic values (e.g., enjoyment, altruism) for the workers
to perform the tasks voluntarily. We believe that this potentially interest-
ing interaction between financial incentives and social motivation will be an
important topic for human computation research.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show that peer consistency evaluation is effective in enhanc-
ing the reliability of human computation systems. Even though the system
does not evaluate its workers by gold standard answers, the mechanism is
effective in motivating workers to put in their effort to generate answers that
are close to the gold standard answers. In fact, we found that although
peer consistency evaluation sometimes incorrectly penalizes the workers, the
potential unfairness in evaluation does not seem to have a large effect that
significantly harms the performance of good workers. Moreover, we show
that reciprocal altruism (i.e., preventing future workers from being penalized
incorrectly) may even make peer consistency evaluation a better mechanism
than traditional gold standard evaluation. Since gold standard answers are
costly to generate, this result provides researchers and practitioners in human
computation (including crowdsourcing) a much more cost-effective option to
ensure system reliability.
In addition, we found that the implicit social interaction of peer consistency
evaluation might be another factor that helps to improve reliability. In our
experiment, the workers under peer consistency evaluation performed well
even when the bonus they could earn was low. This showed that implicit
social interaction might provide some form of a social motivation to workers,
even when the financial incentive was low. This points to the need to conduct
more systematic studies on how social interactions of the workers in a human
computation system affect different forms (social, finanicial, or others) of
incentives and performance. One possible way is, for example, to test if the
workers under peer consistency evaluation are willing to do more tasks than
those without it. This could show whether the implicit social interaction
really motivates the workers to do the tasks voluntarily. Another possibility
is to strengthen the social interactions (e.g., reducing anonymity, message
boards) to test how it affects the reliability of the system.
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We believe that more studies are needed to test the limitation of peer con-
sistency evaluation by applying it to different kinds of tasks. It is possible
that certain tasks may have a wider range of variability of performance, or
certain systematic biases may be observed in workers’ responses. In these
situations, peer consistency evaluation may either lead to worse performance
because of the general perception that answers from a previous worker are
more likely to be wrong than correct; or that certain biases may be magni-
fied as workers start to perceive that previous workers may likely generate
wrong answers (i.e., future workers adapt to bad answers rather than being
encouraged to provide good ones). While these are some of the many possible
directions that are worthy of pursuing, we believe that results from the cur-
rent study provides a small but significant step towards better understanding
of the complexity involved in a human computation system that are useful
for the CSCW community.
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